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Abstract
Ultrasound has been proposed as out-of-band channel
for authentication of peer devices in wireless ad hoc net-
works. Ultrasound can implicitly contribute to secure com-
munication based on inherent limitations in signal propa-
gation, and can additionally be used explicitly by peers to
measure and verify their relative positions. In this paper
we analyse potential attacks on an ultrasonic communica-
tion channel and peer-to-peer ultrasonic sensing, and inves-
tigate how potential attacks translate to application-level
threats for peers seeking to establish a secure wireless link.
Based on our analysis we propose a novel method for au-
thentic communication of short messages over an ultrasonic
channel.
1. Introduction
Spontaneous interaction in wireless ad hoc networks is
especially vulnerable to attacks on the wireless communica-
tion channels. Such attacks include eavesdropping, inject-
ing and modifying packets, replay, or denial of service. We
generally have to assume that attackers are able to mount
‘man-in-the-middle‘ (MITM) attacks, where they agree to
two different keys with the communicating devices and
which subsumes the other attack types. The major problem
of purely wireless communication is therefore key manage-
ment: to securely exchange keys with the intended commu-
nication partner. Using (supposedly) computationally se-
cure key agreement protocols such as Diffie-Hellman [4],
this problem is further shifted to that of authentication: to
securely verify that a key belongs to the intended communi-
cation partner. In pervasive computing, and more generally
in peer-to-peer networking, we can not currently assume the
availability of a globally trusted third party. For sponta-
neous interaction, the only option is therefore ad hoc verifi-
cation of keys, which requires some extra channel with ad-
ditional security properties. This is a channel other than the
main wireless channel and often called ‘out-of-band‘ chan-
nel.
Balfanz et al. introduced the notion of location-limited
channels for out-of-band communication channels that re-
quire devices to be in a certain, user-verifiable spatial re-
lationship in order to establish communication [1]. Kind-
berg et al. discussed constrained channels along similar
lines [11]. A variety of communication technologies have
been considered for implementation of out-of-band chan-
nels with the desired characteristic of limiting communica-
tion to a user-controlled context. This includes ultrasound,
on which we focus our analysis in this paper.
Ultrasound (US) is an interesting candidate technology
for out-of-band communication alongside wireless radio
(RF), for two reasons. First, ultrasound has inherent lim-
itations in signal propagation (unlike RF, US signals are
contained in rooms). Secondly, ultrasonic communication
can be used by peer devices to estimate their relative po-
sitions (from US time-flight measurements, with RF com-
munication for synchronisation [9]), and thus to obtain in-
formation that can be useful for verification of device au-
thenticity. Ultrasound has been noted as a possible technol-
ogy for authentication of peers within a room, exploiting its
broadcast and propagation characteristics [1]. A concrete
protocol design with ultrasound as out-of-band channel for
authentication of spontaneous device associations has been
discussed in [10]. In this protocol, ultrasound is proposed
for out-of-band communication of nonces, and for verifica-
tion of the spatial direction from which a transmission has
been received. However, the protocol has not been imple-
mented, and assumptions made concerning the use of ultra-
sound have neither been tested nor analysed in more depth.
In this paper we contribute an analysis of ultrasound as
out-of-band channel for secure authentication of devices in
wireless ad hoc networks. We assume a device A seeking to
establish a secure wireless link to a device B without prior
knowledge of B, or access to a shared trusted third party.
The principal threat in this scenario is that a man-in-the-
middle E can establish itself between A and B. A and B
may be mobile devices, but they are assumed to be static
in relation to each other during the initial establishment of
the link (but may move freely after successful channel es-
tablishment). The protocol proposed earlier [10] has the
disadvantage that users are expected to move deliberately
to different locations and verify spatial measurements dur-
ing the authentication phase, which can be cumbersome for
ad hoc interaction. We do not assume any explicit actions
by users solely for authentication purposes, but analyse the
security properties of an ultrasonic channel by itself.
In the following sections we first look into properties
of ultrasonic systems that can be exploited for peer au-
thentication. We then analyse attack scenarios on the ul-
trasonic communication channel, and further analyse how
these translate to threats at application level. We conclude
the paper describing a novel method for authentic commu-
nication of short messages over an ultrasonic channel.
2. Properties of Ultrasonic Systems
Devices that use ultrasound as out-of-band channel can
exploit properties of the medium both implicitly and explic-
itly. Ultrasound has propagation characteristics that implic-
itly contribute toward location-limited communication, in
particular by containing signals in rooms which provides
users with a distinct level of control. Devices can use ultra-
sound also explicitly, to estimate their spatial relationship
for purposes of verifying that the device they are talking to
is indeed in the assumed position, for instance ’in front of
the user’.
Ultrasound signals are, due to the large differences in
acoustic impedances between air and solid materials, (al-
most) completely reflected or absorbed by walls, doors and
windows. Bending around doors or other openings causes
chaotic influences on signal propagation and is practically
unpredictable from an attacker’s point of view. Conse-
quently, we can assume signals or messages transmitted
over an ultrasonic channel not to leave a room, and we can
also assume that it is not possible to inject ultrasonic mes-
sages into a room from the outside.
Ultrasound signals travel at comparatively low speed
which makes it possible for a pair of devices to measure
time-of-flight of a pulse or message transmitted over an ul-
trasonic channel, provided they have access to an RF chan-
nel for synchronisation. Time-of-flight measurements allow
for very accurate ranging (i.e. distance estimation) between
peers, with errors reported well below 10cm [13, 9]. Even
better accuracy can be achieved if either multiple emit-
ters or receivers are used to take measurements from dif-
ferent angles (as in ultrasonic positioning infrastructures,
e.g. [7, 14]). However, for our target use, verification of A
and B’s authenticity in a spontaneous encounter, we assume
that devices will not trust other sensors but their own.
Estimation of the direction from which an ultrasound
signal has arrived is possible if a device has multiple re-
ceivers on board. If these receivers are placed sufficiently
far apart then it can be possible to estimate angle-of-arrival
from differences in time-of-flight (this method was sug-
gested though not tried in Kindberg & Zhang’s peer authen-
tication protocol [10]). Another possibility, better suited for
devices of small dimension as typical in mobile scenarios, is
to use an arrangement of receivers facing in different direc-
tions and to derive angle-of-arrival from analysis of peak
signal values (an incoming pulse or message will register
the highest peak with the receiver oriented most closely to
the emitting device). This method has been used for in-
stance in the RELATE system with 3 transceivers covering
180 degrees, with reported raw measurement error of 33 de-
grees [9].
3. Threat analysis for ultrasonic communica-
tion and sensing
For our threat analysis we assume devices A and B seek-
ing to secure communication over a wireless radio network.
We further assume possible use of ultrasound as out-of-band
channel over which messages can be exchanged, and use
of ultrasound synchronised over RF for estimation of dis-
tance and possible relative orientation. Note that transmit-
ting messages over US as part of an authentication protocol
is different from using US for distance-bounding protocols,
introduced as a method for determining the maximum dis-
tance between devices [2]. As shown recently [3], direct
use of US for distance bounding is open to relaying attacks
and thus not considered secure for authentication of peer
devices. For our analysis, we do not assume US to provide
a secure upper bound on the distance.
As for attacker capabilities, we make two principal as-
sumptions:
1. An attacker can stage attacks on the RF channel from
anywhere within the range of the wireless network, to
eavesdrop, to cause Denial-of-Service (DoS), or to im-
pose itself as man-in-the-middle (MITM) between A
and B (to the effect that A and B believe to be talking
to each other, while actually talking to E).
2. Attacker capabilities on the US channel depend on how
the attacker is located relative to the attacked devices1;
in other words, we assume that an attacker is not able
to ‘virtualize’ their position by using groups or whole
arrays of coordinated ultrasound emitters. Note that
speaker arrays can be used for spatialised audio [5]
but due to the shorter wavelength of ultrasound and
its more complex propagation characteristics, it would
appear prohibitively difficult to achieve accurate ultra-
sound spatialisation.
1With location or position of an attacker we actually refer to the posi-
tion of the communication device used to mount the attack.
Figure 1. The capability of E to stage an at-
tack on ultrasonic communication and sens-
ing between A and B depends on how E is
positioned with respect to A and B.
Figure 1 illustrates our scenario with devices A and B,
and an attacker E that can be in different positions (E0, E1,
etc.) with respect to A and B. In the following we analyse
potential threats to ultrasonic communication and sensing
between A and B for each of these positions:
1. E0 – outside room: It is an inherent property of ul-
trasound that signals are blocked by walls, doors and
windows. Therefore we can assume that it is not pos-
sible to eavesdrop on ultrasound communication from
outside a room, and that it is also not possible to inter-
fere with the ultrasound channel from the outside, i.e to
insert or modify messages that would compromise ul-
trasonic communication between A and B. While US
signals can bend around doors or corners, this sub-
jects them to distortions that in practice also exclude
meaningful attacks. In such situations, accurate loca-
tion information for both attacker and victim would be
needed to produce proper time-delay-of-arrival at the
receiver; creating an arbitrary angle-of-arrival is pro-
hibitively difficult [8].
However, an attacker E would still be able to mount
an attack on the RF channel, for general denial of ser-
vice, targeted prevention of devices from discovery on
the network, or tampering with messages that may be
used for synchronisation of ultrasonic sensing. The
concrete threats with respect to ultrasonic communi-
cation and sensing are: a) to prevent a device from
participation in ultrasonic communication, for exam-
ple to the effect that a target device B selected by a user
with device A becomes barred from authenticating it-
self; b) to cause erroneous distance estimates, i.e. hav-
ing A estimate B to be closer or further away then they
actually are and thus compromising any distance- or
position-based verification procedure; and c) to mod-
ify any distance, orientation, or position estimates ex-
changed over RF (note it is common in ultrasonic po-
sitioning system to exchange measurements over RF,
but it is not required and can be avoided). Threat b)
also invalidates any assumptions that may be made for
distance-bounding methods, even without more com-
plex relay attacks as described earlier [3].
2. E1 – in room: If E is in the same room with A and B,
or more precisely in the same propagation range, then
E will have the additional capability to listen to all ul-
trasound communication, and to insert pulses or mes-
sages on the ultrasound channel, at any time with arbi-
trary signal strength. However, E will not generally be
able modify or replace other messages exchanged over
the channel, e.g. between A and B, unless E is po-
sitioned ”more strategically” in cases we discuss fur-
ther below. Concrete threats arising are thus: d) to
eavesdrop on the ultrasound channel; e) to insert ultra-
sonic pulses or messages with a potential of confusing
or compromising ultrasonic sensing between other de-
vices, and to present itself at a certain distance (cf. case
E2); and f) to block ultrasound transmission, which,
depending on the specific implementation of ultrasonic
sensing and the sophistication of the attack, may or
may not be distinguishable from signal noise. The dis-
tinction between blocking of transmission, i.e. denial
of service, and selectively removing messages sent by
other devices is blurred.
3. E2 – equidistant positions: If E is positioned at the
same distance from a receiving device (e.g. A) as the
intended target device (e.g. B) then E might achieve
to be verified as B, if verification were based on dis-
tance only. Obviously if E is positioned equidistant
from both devices, it may achieve positive verification
by both and A and B as a man-in-the middle. Note
that E can easily make itself appear at a particular dis-
tance from a single receiver, from anywhere in its ul-
trasonic range, by emitting an ultrasonic pulse or mes-
sage ahead of the synchronisation schedule (to appear
nearer) or delayed after a synchronisation point (to be
appear farther). The threat in either case is: g) to ap-
pear at the same distance as the target device, and it
highlights the value of angle-of-arrival estimates in ad-
dition to range measurements for device verification
purposes.
4. E3 – in line: When E manages to position itself in
line with A and B, its US messages will be received
at an angle-of-arrival that corresponds with the angle
at which the device ’in the middle’ is positioned from
the perspective of the receiving device. For example,
in the scenario shown in Fig. 1, E will appear to be
B from A’s point of view, but not to be A from B’s
point of view. The threat is thus: h) to appear from the
same angle to a single device. Note that peer-to-peer
angle-of-arrival estimates tend not to be very accurate
in practice and thus it may suffice for E to approximate
a position in line with A and B, in order to produce this
threat.
5. E4 – in between: A position at some point on the line
directly in between A and B offers E most capabilities
for an attack on US communication and sensing be-
tween A and B. US messages produced by E will be
received from the same angle at which A and B are po-
sitioned respectively, creating threat i) to appear from
the same angle to both devices. Additionally, by be-
ing directly in the line of US signalling between A and
B, the attacker E may be able j) to cancel or modify
specific US messages in transit, by means of gener-
ating anti-ultrasound (similar to noise-cancellation in
audio).
Table 1 summarises threats to ultrasonic communication
and sensing:
Case Threats Safeguards
E0 Attack on RF US safe as out-of-band
channel for authentication
E1, E2 Attack on Check for duplicate pulses,
US ranging verify angle of arrival
E3 Attack from Mutual verification of
direction of target positions
E4 Attack from Requires additional
direction of peer measures
Table 1. Summary of threats and safeguards
The main conclusions from this analysis are:
• Ultrasound can be effective as out-of-band channel for
authentication of peer devices if the presence of an
attacker in the same room can be ruled out by other
means.
• If an attacker has access to the same room as the peer
devices, then US ranging as such is not safe for further
limiting the communication channel.
• Angle-of-arrival can be used to further constrain the
communication channel, and to limit the possibility of
an attack to attacker positions approximately in line
with the peer devices; only cases E3 and E4 remain to
be addressed. Verifying angle-of-arrival also prevents
attacks from outside the room that may be relying on
reflections e.g. at half-open doors.
4. Application-level threats
In this section we extend our analysis to review
application-level threats for devices that use RF in combi-
nation with ultrasonic communication and sensing for au-
thentication of peers. For our discussion we assume A to be
a device operated by a user, and B to be a target device se-
lected by the user for association with their device. B may
be a device in the environment, or the device of another user.
1. Replacement: The first threat on application-level is
for the attacker E to virtually replace the intended tar-
get device (say B), to the effect that A authenticates E
instead of the actual target. For E to achieve this attack,
they need to first ‘silence’ B so that B does not emit
ultrasound and remains undetected by A (see threats
a and f as discussed in the previous section). E fur-
ther needs to pass potential verification of its position,
which it can achieve by manipulating the distance at
which it would be sensed by A (threats b and e, or g),
and by positioning itself in line with A and B (cases
E3 and E4, threat h). In this attack, interaction occurs
only between A and E, and no interaction occurs with
B. This scenario is limited to situations where the user
does not expect a human-verifiable response from B in
the process of interaction.
2. Asynchronous MITM: An asynchronous MITM attack
occurs when the attacker E first achieves authentica-
tion with A (replacing B as described above), and in
a second step with B (without the need to pretend to
be A, and thus without positional constraint). E can
then intercept messages from A, and forward them to
B, to ensure a response of B as expected by the user.
An example for such a situation would be printing: A,
when sending a document to a printer B, expects it to
print shortly afterwards. In this scenario, the attacker
avoids detection by forwarding intercepted messages.
However, the scenario requires that B does not verify
the sender of the messages (only A authenticates B, but
not the other way around).
3. Synchronous MITM: For a synchronous MITM attack
E must achieve to establish itself between A and B on
both the RF and the US channel, to appear to A as B
and vice versa. If A and B use angle-of-arrival in the
authentication process, E will only be able to achieve
this attack if positioned literally in the middle between
A and B (case E4).
Spontaneous interactions commonly occur in unknown
and open environments, and generally it will not be possi-
ble to rule out the presence of an attacker in close enough
proximity, and not blocked by walls, in order to threaten
peer authentication. For peers to guard further against at-
tacks, sensing of angle-of-arrival can be used to signifi-
cantly constrain the positions from which attacks remain
possible (leaving cases E3 and E4).
If we assume A as a user’s device to be mobile but B to
be a stationary device, such as a printer, then it might be
plausible that an attacker positions itself strategically, to be
in line between the stationary device and a likely user posi-
tion. A scenario E3 might be excluded when B is mounted
to a wall, or placed against wall. However, if B is also a mo-
bile device, carried by another user, then it will generally be
more difficult and less likely that an attacker achieves to po-
sition themselves between A and B. It could be argued that
a user would naturally detect any device positioned between
its own device A, and a target device, but it has to be noted
that attacks would be possible with very small wireless sen-
sor nodes.
If we accept the possibility of a malicious sensor node
E directly between A and B then we need to consider more
closely the node’s attacking capability, in particular for can-
cellation and replacement of US messages in transit (threat
j). If A sends a US message triggered over RF, E will need
to cancel the message with anti-ultrasound, and generate its
own US message directed at B. The smaller E is, the less
time E has to replace a message to reach B within the ex-
pected time-of-flight, because of the time it takes the US
messages to pass by E. For example, if E measures only
a few centimetres so not to conspicuous, then it will only
have a few hundred microseconds for the computations re-
quired for modifying the pulse, which, in current wireless
sensor hardware, will not be sufficient. Moreover, given the
propagation characteristics of ultrasound, it would not seem
plausible that pulses can be cancelled without noise effects
that would allow to uncover the attack.
5. Authentic communication of short messages
over an ultrasonic channel
In this section we introduce a method for communica-
tion of short messages over ultrasound, effectively coding
bits as distance quantities, in a way that ensures decoding
only to be possible by a receiver who is positioned at an ex-
pected distance from the sender. This method is designed
to overcome the problem that ultrasonic ranging as such
is open to attack, and allows effective use of distance es-
timates to constrain ultrasonic communication. As for the
application-level threat discussed, it can be used in conjunc-
tion with angle-of-arrival verification, in order to safeguard
against attack in cases E3 and E4 (providing the ’additional
measure’ referred to in table 1, under the assumption that
the attacker is not able to modify messages in transit).
Our method requires in a first step, that the authenticat-
ing devices take a reference measurement of their distance,
(a) The sender delays an US pulse after the
RF trigger to code a message, which corre-
sponds to a distance in the spatial domain.
(b) The receiver measures time from trigger
to pulse arrival, and subtracts a stored refer-
ence from the corresponding distance to re-
trieve the message.
Figure 2. Message transmission embedded
with ultrasonic ranging.
and that this measurement is verified by a user. This can
be elegantly achieved if all devices discovered in ultrasonic
sensing range are displayed in a map corresponding with
their real-world placement, as proposed in [9] for seamless
interaction with across devices.
As illustrated in Figure 2(a), a sender transmits informa-
tion by delaying an ultrasonic pulse in relation to an RF syn-
chronisation message. By delaying the US pulse, the time-
of-flight and thus distance will appear larger than it is, and
the virtually added distance represents the transmitted in-
formation. A receiver retrieves the virtually added distance
and thus the message by subtracting the reference measure-
ment from their actual measurement, see Figure 2(b). The
receiver will only be able to retrieve the message content, if
the sender’s distance matches the stored reference. By re-
trieving the random nonce this way, it can be used in higher-
level protocols as an authentic message from the remote
host. Note that the transmitted information is not private;
any receiver in the same room will see the same virtually
added distance, in comparison to previous measurements.
The authenticity of the proposed channel is created by
delaying US pulses, but only provided E does not know the
transmitted information beforehand. We propose that the
channel can be used for transmitting nonces as part of an
authentication protocol such as the MANA I protocol [6].
For authenticity of messages, both the distance and the an-
gle must match the expectations of the receiver. We have
already argued that the attacker will not be able to manipu-
late angle-of-arrival measurements, but E could still be po-
sitioned in between A and B (case E4). E could also cre-
ate US pulses so to appear to come from A’s or B’s posi-
tion, but only if it knows when the pulse would be sent.
This though depends on the message content, and in the
case of nonces would be random. When E introduces its
own pulses, the received message will be different from the
nonce that the sender transmitted, and authentication proto-
cols can be constructed to detect this. The random element
and distance-based coding make the US channel authen-
tic. We have implemented a concrete authentication pro-
tocol using this property in conjunction with an interlock
protocol and based on an existing peer-to-peer US sensing
platform [12].
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed and discussed security
properties of ultrasound as out-of-band channel in the con-
text of peer device authentication. We identified potential
threats to ultrasonic communication and sensing in depen-
dence of attacker position, and analysed how these trans-
late to application-level threats. A particular observation
is the vulnerability of ultrasonic ranging to manipulation.
To address this problem, and to provide an authentic out-
of-band channel, we proposed a new method for distance-
coded communication over ultrasound.
Our proposed method of piggy-backing information on
single ultrasound pulses makes the US channel authentic,
and thus protects against synchronous MITM attacks even
when assuming far-reaching attacker capabilities. Protect-
ing against asynchronous MITM attacks requires changes
to the application, e.g. to light an LED when the infrastruc-
ture device is engaged in an interaction. Then a user could
notice the delay between the two interactions and abort the
transaction.
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